The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent the official views or policies of the U.S. Government or any of its agencies.
If the United States wants to truly challenge Chinese technology dominance, it must build an international consensus leveraging its key alliances and partnerships like NATO, Five Eyes, USMCA, or the Quad to establish a trusted technology ecosystem across critical industries, especially those bridging the cyber-physical divide. Achieving this consensus will not be easy. It will require international cooperation to overcome geopolitical resistance, economic incentives that favor status quo, and the technical complexity of securing an international digital marketplace. Fortunately, the United States already has the alliance structures, diplomatic networks and domestic authorities to execute this strategy and avoid a future where China controls the global "real economy." To realize this alternate future, the United States must move first, but not alone.
As an initial matter, it is essential that we restrict Chinese consumer and technology products from Western and western-aligned domestic technology ecosystems given the blurry line between the cyber domain and the physical world. The urgency of this endeavor stems from the evolving nature of national security. Traditionally, sovereignty was understood in physical terms: control over territory, military assets, and economic resources. Today, however, sovereignty also depends on who controls the data, software, and digital systems that power national infrastructure. A compromised power grid, an infiltrated telecommunications network, or a manipulated industrial control system can pose as great a threat as a kinetic strike.
A unified technology framework across allied nations is necessary to counteract the influence of adversarial state-controlled industries. The People's Republic of China has spent decades positioning itself as the dominant supplier of key digital infrastructure from 5G networks to IoT devices. Unlike Western corporations that operate independently of their governments, Chinese technology firms are inextricably linked to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and operate under laws that compel cooperation with state intelligence operations.
Building a trusted marketplace across key international partnerships offers a way forward. By creating unified supply chain standards, restricting the use of untrusted vendors, and pooling demand for secure alternatives, the U.S. and its allies can create a market for secure technology. This would provide an incentive for companies to meet rigorous security and supply chain standards while reducing dependence on adversarial suppliers.
The United States already has many tools at its disposal. To implement this standard at home, the federal government could use a combination of International Emergency Economic Powers Act emergency declaration and associated tariffs, increased exercise of the Department of Commerce's supply chain authorities under Executive Order 13873, and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) equipment authorization and telecommunications services regulations to address cybersecurity supply chain risks while also creating the conditions for increased domestic and allied manufacturing.
Several statements of administration policy have begun to recognize the need for allied cooperation on critical and emerging technology to achieve allied scale manufacturing. The United States's technology prosperity agreements with Japan and Korea included sections devoted to "Trusted Technology Leadership." The 2025 Quad foreign ministers meeting joint resolution stated that "The Quad recognizes the transformative power of critical and emerging technologies and will continue to advance secure and trusted information and communications technology infrastructure while expanding our work on artificial intelligence, semiconductors, technical standards, biotechnology, and cybersecurity."
Opponents of this framework will primarily be motivated by short-term economic incentives. Many industries, particularly in manufacturing and telecommunications, have grown dependent on low-cost, software-enabled Chinese components. Transitioning to a secure supply chain will involve short-term costs. However, the long-term cost of inaction is far greater. The economic damage from a major cyber-physical attack would easily outweigh the cost of building a resilient system in the first place.
Finally, cybersecurity professionals and information technology companies will be the first to point to existing cybersecurity frameworks as existing means to mitigate cyber risks. However, existing standards are designed to protect against unauthorized access by third parties. They do not address the fundamental problem of untrusted vendors having built-in access to their products. A supply chain risk posed by an adversarial manufacturer cannot be mitigated by cybersecurity best practices alone. A viable solution is to exclude such vendors from the market altogether, replacing them with secure alternatives from trusted partners.
The path forward requires bold action. The U.S. and its allies must first establish a common framework that defines which industries and technologies require secure supply chains and what standards must be met. The alternative is unacceptable. A world in which adversarial states control key components of digital and cyber-physical infrastructure is a world where democratic nations cede their national sovereignty. To avoid this outcome, America must act first to build a multilateral challenge to PRC manufacturing dominance, but its chance of success is greater if it doesn't act alone.