The nation's security hinges on a robust and adaptable Defense Industrial Base (DIB), but our optimization for efficiency (e.g., cost, time, material) has led us to non-optimal states for resiliency in the face of modern threats. The global chip shortage of 2020-2023 demonstrated that disruptions to the microelectronics supply chain are disruptions to national security and the war in Ukraine exposed how assets are quickly used with insufficient replenishment in our existing DIB. These challenges highlight a critical need for new ideas to support increasing our DIB production capacity while maintaining cost-effectiveness and discretion.
To support the needs of a cost-effective and discreet methodology for increasing DIB production capacity, we propose Resilient Underpinning for Base Building, Economic Reinvestment, and Discreet Utility Capacity Keeping Yields (RUBBER DUCKY) as a conceptual economic statecraft framework. RUBBER DUCKY is a reimagined "Your Business Goes to War" (YBGW) concept going beyond identification of latent production capability of civilian companies to include leveraging and incentivizing investment to increase latent production capacity for the DIB.
We recognize the potential trivialization of the discussion by calling out a 'rubber duck', but we strive to push forward thought that invokes the drive for ingenuity seen in our earlier War Production Board conversations of conversion. We encourage readers to think in creative ways of leveraging production pathways of even the most inconspicuous objects to serve as pathways of increasing DIB capacity.
RUBBER DUCKY can have multiple methods of incentivization - but for now we consider the most zero order alignment - namely modernized conversion. We recognize that through incentivized private investment in non-DIB companies whose commercial operations use tooling, labor, and inputs similar to those needed for defense applications, the government can discreetly and cost-effectively increase DIB production capacity.
As an illustrative example, consider the production of a rubber duck. The rubber duck production requires polymers and dyes as inputs and rotational molding tools for instrumentation to create seamless, hollow, durable structures. A missile has many systems, subsystems, and components, but they also include internal tanks for hydraulic fluids, coolants, and other non-propellant liquids used by different missile subsystems like the control surface actuators. Conceivably, a rubber duck manufacturer would be able to receive new design documents for computer aided manufacturing (CAM) to then alter their rotational molding process to generate missile subsystem liquid tanks.
Additional examples include commercial medical implants production companies converting to specialized munition fuze components where both use high grade titanium as raw inputs with multi-axis computer numerical control (CNC) machining production, or commercial drones for recreation to be repurposed for loitering or kamikaze munitions.
To enable a RUBBER DUCKY concept, we have two main thrusts of applied research needed:
The historical usage of the Arsenal of Democracy and Freedom Forge have been well documented (e.g., utilization of the US automotive industry for materiel). However, DIB usage of commercial non-DIB latent production capacity is not a new concept at the present moment. We actively use it for naval ship and submarine maintenance, personal protective equipment (PPE) and sanitizer during the COVID-19 pandemic, and various minerals with and without Defense Product Act (DPA) authorities. However even with abundant funds, utilization of known latent capacity can be insufficient as seen with munitions in Ukraine. This is where RUBBER DUCKY can support identification of previously unidentified latent production capacity.
To achieve the goal of discreetly increasing DIB production capacity through government incentivization of private capital into the industrial base, the government can and should explore a range of incentive mechanisms that go beyond conventional procurement contracts. These may include direct financial mechanisms like those available under DPA Title III, but also other creative "no-cost" incentives that are highly appealing to the private sector. Such no-cost incentives could include:
Tariff Exemptions: RUBBER DUCKY could identify certain harmonized system (HS) commodities and associated activities that are upstream of the final desired commodity for DIB to offer tariff exemptions on critical machinery or raw materials.
H-1B Visa Prioritization: The government could identify key companies and facilities to offer prioritized and/or discounted H-1B visas for specialized labor through the RUBBER DUCKY YBGW capabilities. This addresses a key risk in industrial capacity: the availability of skilled labor.
Infrastructure and Permitting Fast-Tracking: The government could fast-track permitting and other regulatory approvals for facility expansions or new construction projects related to the program.
Free Market Trading Mechanisms: Create a marketplace for acquisition risk swaps could encourage additional market participation via speculation from private capital while capability providers participate in the market potentially increasing their latent capacity.
Beyond immediate DIB production capabilities, incentivizing manufacturing on-shoring for critical industries reduces strategic vulnerabilities while rebuilding America's industrial sovereignty. In the worst-case scenario of large-scale conflict, this approach positions the United States with robust domestic economic capacity for post-war reconstruction and competition, recognizing that pre-war trading relationships and supply chains may be permanently disrupted. The framework thus serves dual purposes: deterring conflict through demonstrated industrial strength while ensuring economic self-sufficiency should deterrence fail.
If successful, RUBBER DUCKY will have shown a framework and set of capabilities that can be leveraged by offices supporting industrial base policy or manufacturing. The RUBBER DUCKY concept aims to maximize targeted Defense Industrial Base (DIB) production capacities by inferring and cataloging the industrial base's production functions. This is achieved through economic modeling of diverse incentivization mechanisms, which generate 'bodies of evidence' to support optimal investment strategies. This approach would transform industrial policy from a reactive, crisis-driven function into a proactive, strategically managed element of national security.